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Abstract 
This paper proposes to address the need for more innovation in organisational information security by adding a 
security requirement engineering focus. Based on the belief that any heavyweight security requirements process 
in organisational security will be doomed to fail, we developed a security requirement approach with three 
dimensions. The use of a simple security requirements process in the first dimension has been augmented by an 
agile security approach. However, introducing this second dimension of agile security does provide support for, 
but does not necessarily stimulate, innovation. A third dimension is, therefore, needed to ensure there is a proper 
focus in the organisation's efforts to identify potential new innovations in their security. To create this focus three 
common shortcomings in organisational information security have been identified. The resulting security 
approach that addresses these shortcomings is called Ubiquitous Information Security. This paper will 
demonstrate the potential of this new approach by briefly discussing its possible application in two areas: 
Ubiquitous Identity Management and Ubiquitous Wireless Security. 
Keywords 
Security requirement engineering, agile security, ubiquitous security, ubiquitous identity management, wireless 
intrusion detection 
INTRODUCTION 
At present, organisations are often ill-prepared to cope with the increased risks in their IT environment whilst 
their reliance on computers and computerised communication devices continues to grow (Ngo et. al. 2005). 
Over the past decades the number of reported security incidents and the resulting losses has been rising steadily. 
While security technology and security management are rapidly becoming more complex, they have not been 
able to keep up with the rapid adoption of new IT technologies and new business practices. 
Deciding which security strategies, architectures and applications to deploy is still a major issue for most 
organisations. In this paper, we suggest that one of the major problems in organisational information security is 
that current security management lacks innovation and is still mainly based on now inadequate 20th century risk 
management (Shedden et. al. 2006) and security standards/applications (Tan & Ruighaver 2005). While 
previous papers have identified other common shortcomings in security governance and security culture 
(Ruighaver et. al. 2007), this paper will propose the use of security requirement engineering at the organisational 
security level to address the lack of innovation. 
While security requirement engineering in software engineering is a rapidly growing research area (Crook et. al. 
2002), the use of security requirement engineering at the organisational level is currently almost non-existent. 
According to Maiden and Robertson (2005) “Requirements Engineering is a creative process in which stake-
holders and designers work together to create ideas for new systems that are eventually expressed as 
requirements”. Hence, an obvious approach to address the lack of innovation in organisational security will be to 
introduce a proper requirement engineering process in security management.  
The main decision making process currently used in information security is the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle as 
documented in the current security standards. This PDCA model, however, is less suitable for “situations that 
are invariably uncertain, dynamic and confusing” (Grant & Kooter 2005). Our research in security culture 
(Ruighaver & Maynard 2006) also indicates that organisations using PDCA often do not actively pursue 
understanding of the current security situation in their organisation anymore. This, we believe, will severely 
complicate any attempts to improve security in a cost-effective manner. Hence, any new approach in security 
management will need to emphasise security failures instead of just concentrating on security successes. 
Further more, the current approach to information security is based on a heavyweight process which starts with 
an extensive risk analysis, followed by the development of a security policy and the implementation of that 
policy. While this process looks akin to the waterfall approach in software engineering, in practice there are a 
number of common deficiencies found in the way organizations develop their information security. 
The growing complexity of ICT has increased the cost of a systematic risk analysis. This cost has become so 
high that organizations can no longer afford to perform this risk analysis at a low enough level of granularity 
needed to accurately identify the controls that might mitigate these risks (Shedden et.al. 2006). Unfortunately, 
the shortcuts that organizations take to simplify the risk identification and analysis have a detrimental effect on 
the quality of the risk analysis, a fact seldom recognized by the organization. 
These and similar experiences has lead to our decision to adapt a lightweight requirement engineering process. 
Keeping the requirement engineering process lightweight, however, means that we can not extend the 
requirement process itself to improve creativity (Nguyen et.al. 2000). While this issue will undoubtedly be 
explored in future research, the rest of this paper will explore two other dimensions of the requirements 
engineering approach needed to support and stimulate innovation. 
In a section on Agile Information Security we discuss how the adoption of security requirements engineering  
introduces several new challenges. These challenges, as well as the lack of prioritisation guidelines in the 
current standards (Tan & Ruighaver. 2005) and the increasingly dynamic nature of the security environment in 
organizations (Peterson et.al. 2002, Pye et.al. 2005) suggest that there is a need to develop a more agile 
approach to information security. 
On its own, however, agile security does not address the need for more innovation. While, for now, we declined 
to enhance the requirement process itself to stimulate creativity, we would like to ensure that the requirement 
process receives some direction.  Creativity is simply not useful if the resulting solutions are not relevant and 
effective (Bruner 1962). In our final section on Ubiquitous Information Security, we identify three common 
shortcomings in organisational security to provide a focus in the requirement engineering process.   
While this paper can not, and will not, attempt to describe the ultimate Ubiquitous Information Security 
approach or solution,  it tries to demonstrate the potential of this new approach by discussing its possible 
application in two main areas: Ubiquitous Identity Management and Ubiquitous Wireless Security. 
ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY ENGINEERING 
While organisations are, in general, willing to invest more in their information security, they are still struggling 
coming to a decision where to best increase their security effort and which security strategies, architectures and 
applications they need to deploy to achieve the most cost-effective solution. Unfortunately, while there are 
standards such as ISO27002 and Cobit that provide lists of what controls should be implemented, they provide 
little guidance on when these controls are relevant, what alternatives are available, or what requirements these 
controls really fulfil.  
Investigating the literature on requirement engineering for security applications and systems did not deliver any 
immediately usable insights either. Few papers have been found on (explicit) requirements for information 
security or security applications or on the need to re-use requirements. While it would be possible to investigate 
the literature on particular security systems and extract the implicit requirements for those systems from the 
design discussions, we were not convinced that the results would be helpful in our effort to increase creativity at 
the organisational security level. Further more, little evidence could be found that the requirement processes 
used in application security encourage creativity. 
The only area of systems security where requirements and requirement engineering is taken more seriously is in 
cryptography. However, while there is a standard on (functional) security requirements for cryptographic 
modules, no proper guidelines are available for general applications using cryptography.  Realisation has been 
growing that applications of cryptography normally break because of human factors and implementation 
problems but, while a similar problem occurs in organisational security, it is not clear what lessons can be 
learned from cryptography that are relevant for organisational security. 
Probably more relevant for this research is the literature on security requirement solicitation in information 
systems design. Although there seems to be a growing interest in the use of misuse cases in security requirement 
solicitation, we feel that the development of misuse cases as part of the  requirement solicitation process itself 
might not work in organisational security requirements engineering. We are currently investigating its use in 
incident reporting and expect that a repository of misuse cases borrowed from information systems design will 
be useful in organisational security as well.  
The largest body of work in this area that is relevant for organisational security is the research on reuse of 
security requirements and artefacts (Firesmith 2004). We need new research that identifies re-usable artefacts 
that are useful at the security architecture and security applications level, but again we believe it may be 
necessary to develop separate processes, for instance through a feedback process based on incident reporting, to 
ensure that the development and maintenance of repositories for those artefacts takes place independent from the 
actual security requirement elicitation process.   
As discussed before, our starting point is that the actual security requirement engineering process needs to be a 
lightweight process. Unfortunately, many current security requirement engineering methodologies proposed for 
use in software engineering such as TROPOS  and SQUARE (Mead et.al. 2005) are complex and may therefore 
not be cost-effective in an organisational security context. More importantly, the organisational security 
architect or other security expert that becomes responsible is likely to lack any experience in these software 
engineering methodologies and a simple to understand methodology is therefore preferred. 
Although we aim to start with a lightweight process, we have no objection against making the process slightly 
more extensive in future. However, our experience with decision making processes such as the previously 
mentioned PDCA is that organisations always tend to simplify the process. So we would like to ensure that the 
top level structure of the requirement process still produces good requirements, before we add more structure 
underneath each step of the process.  
Our current approach, therefore is to adopt a simple process borrowed from User Requirement Specification in 
Software Engineering 
• Elicitation/Identification  
• Analysis 
• Specification 
• Communication 
As the above process is extensively described in many software engineering papers and books we will not 
further elaborate on each of the four steps in this paper, but instead will discuss some of the issues related to the 
use of this process in organisational security. 
Firstly, organisational security requirement engineering can and should be used at many levels of the security 
strategic context (Tan & Ruighaver 2005), in particular at the strategic level, the security infrastructure level and 
the security application level. In this paper we will demonstrate the proposed concepts at the application level. It 
is important to understand that security requirement engineering at the application level does not necessarily 
identify requirements of a particular security application but instead aims to identify which applications are 
needed to satisfy the organisation's security needs. 
It should also be obvious that before the security requirement process starts, the organisation first needs to 
identify which area of its organisational information security it would like to improve. This is similar to when 
you start developing a software application: You will need some idea what kind of application it is. In the 
examples used in this paper, the author has chosen two areas that are common problem areas in organisational 
security.  Fortunately, the ubiquitous approach introduced in this paper will also ensure that, in time, a better 
understanding of the organisation's security will develop. 
In the proposed requirement specification process, it will be the task of an Organisational Security Architect to 
interview the stake-holders as part of the Elicitation stage. As we do not expect any initial domain knowledge 
from most of the stake-holders, this first step will need the architect to be the expert, brief the stake-holders, and 
provide direction. The quality of the requirements will therefore depend largely on the domain knowledge of the 
architect and his willingness to encourage creativity. One of the aims of the rest of this paper is therefore to 
provide this organisational security architect with at least one potentially effective direction that he might find 
useful to explore. 
Finally, there is still an open issue of how we will evaluate the quality of the resulting requirements. Future 
research in this area is needed as well. Whatever framework the organisation eventually will decide to adopt,  
however, it will need to address at least the following issues: 
• Simplicity and Cost-effectiveness  
• Balance and coverage (as in any security approach) 
• Innovation 
AGILE INFORMATION SECURITY 
As mentioned before, there seems to be a reluctance in most organisations to employ heavyweight processes in 
the management of information security although most standards still encourage an approach akin to the 
waterfall approach in software engineering. Life cycle models proposed for security policy implementation are 
normally also based on waterfall like approach. 
A major problem faced by organisations is that the dynamic security environment is forcing them to reduce the 
time frame of their security implementation. Hence, organisations both use shortcuts in their risk assessment 
phase and in their implementation phase. While as a result, the process followed is no longer a real waterfall 
approach, it still suffers from the main disadvantage of this approach that ignited the software engineering 
revolution: The heavy cost of maintenance.  Some of the organisations that we have studied in the past have 
even decided that it would be more cost-effective to just start from scratch again.   
Another major reason why the current development process in information security is not really a proper 
waterfall approach is the general lack of documentation on the policy development process (Maynard & 
Ruighaver 2003). Heavyweight software development processes rely on documentation (Khan & Balbo 2004), 
but our experience is that organisations seldom have a proper documentation of the risk analysis process, or of 
the link between the risks that the organisation wants to control and the actual controls in their policy. This will 
therefore severely hamper any further development of their information security. 
At the same time, the lack of domain knowledge within organisations on security requirements at both the  
security infrastructure and security application level will make any initial attempt at organisational security 
engineering less effective and indicates that an agile approach to organisational security might be in order. 
Further more, adding a security requirement focus to organisational security will, on its own, not solve the above 
mentioned problems unless we attempt to be innovative and look outside the current set of traditional controls. 
Identifying, developing, and assessing the cost-effectiveness of new controls will, however, be a  process of  
trial and error. Hence, it is important that we change the current mind set in both organisations and in 
information security research that information security is based on a waterfall approach.  
One important aspect of agile security is that organisations will need to gain better knowledge of internal 
security to assist in the prioritisation of agile security projects. Hence, organisations might want to consider 
starting with some agile projects related to the monitoring of security. The particular approach to agile security 
proposed in this paper, as described in the next section on Ubiquitous Information Security, aims to improve the 
balance between preventive controls and detection and response. So each agile project based on this approach 
will automatically provide data that can be used to prioritise further agile projects. 
Finally, like always, it is important in information security that your security covers all potential risks. 
Fortunately, there is less need in agile security to accept risks. By evaluating the balance between continued 
improvement of existing agile projects and starting new projects, the organisation has more opportunities to 
increase its coverage. Agile security encourages the organisation to keep thinking about what instead of how. 
Hence, choosing an agile security approach is an opportunity to be innovative in your security coverage as well. 
UBIQUITOUS INFORMATION SECURITY 
Agile Security is a necessity in today's security environment, but adopting an agile security approach is only a 
start. The aim of agile security should be continuous innovation. Applying an agile security approach to 
traditional information security will only offer limited improvement. 
To give direction to the requirements engineering process at the application level, we would expect the 
organisation to have both a strategic direction as well as a preferred security infrastructure. While we believe 
good security governance needs to follow a top down approach, we also realise that most organisations still 
follow a bottom up approach as they are used to do in IT governance. As a result, mission statements in 
organisations are often general statements about information security and the strategy communicated to IT and 
security staff is normally restricted to “follow this standard”. 
This lack of strategic direction in organisations will make it difficult for those organisations to be creative in 
their organisational security requirement engineering. Too provide some general direction to this creative 
process, we have therefore identified three basic security principles/strategies that we would like to see in an 
organisation: 
• Current security is too preventive; we need a better balance between prevention and 
detection/response. For each preventive control we really should also have detection and response 
planned for when that control fails. One good example of this obsession with preventive controls is the 
current state of the art in authentication and access control: I have found no organisations that even 
consider detecting masquerading attacks or monitoring their user's file access patterns. Another 
example is Defence in Depth, which was originally a reactive strategy but is now actively promoted as 
a pure preventive strategy. 
• Security should be based on multiple overlapping controls instead of one single complex control. 
Currently many security controls are just too complex. It is a well known principle of asymmetric 
warfare that complexity in defence favours the attacker. Furthermore, this escalation in preventive 
controls often hinders detection of attackers bypassing the control. 
• We need to better integrate security with every day activities and in every day devices. Nowadays 
users have USB sticks, PDA’s, mobile phones, etc, that may endanger your security but might also be 
used to improve your security. And, while many organisations now have strict physical access control 
in their buildings, most keep these physical access control systems separated from their authentication 
and access control of IT systems. 
Ubiquitous Information Security is an approach that utilises these principles to build a security architecture that 
can be tailored to the organisation's security needs. The aim is not to make security perfect, but to find a way to 
optimise security for each organisation. Of course, this is not necessarily the ultimate set of security strategies 
that an organisation can use to direct its security efforts. These three have been chosen to demonstrate the power 
of a strategic approach to direct innovation at the application level. Research is continuing to identify more 
strategies that fit with this original set.  
Some other requirements for an ubiquitous security infrastructure/architecture are: 
• An ubiquitous security architecture should be based on multiple small security mechanisms or 
applications that work together to create a practical and robust approach to security. At least one of 
those mechanisms or applications will need to be detective/reactive. 
• Mechanisms and applications designed for one ubiquitous security architecture should be designed 
for reuse in other ubiquitous security architectures. 
• Similar to ubiquitous computing, an obvious trend in ubiquitous security will be the use of location 
information. This could include access control based on location of user and authentication based on 
location of personal devices. 
Evaluating potential requirements for an ubiquitous security infrastructure has brought up some new issues that 
we consider important enough that they may also have some relevance outside ubiquitous security. Although we 
are hesitant at this moment to elevate them to the strategic level, we may decide do so in future. These issues 
are: 
• Ubiquitous security should not be invisible. Users should be continuously aware of the potential 
impact of their activities and decisions on the organisation’s information security. 
• While users should be aware of the security surrounding them, ubiquitous information security 
should not inhibit the user’s normal activities. 
• An ubiquitous security approach is likely to utilise new technologies that may have an increased 
impact on the user's privacy.  Hence, it will be necessary to balance the need for security with the user’s 
need for privacy. 
TWO EXAMPLES OF UBIQUITOUS INFORMATION SECURITY PROJECTS 
As stated before, it is up to the organisation to prioritise which agile security projects will be most beneficial for 
that organisation's security. To illustrate the ubiquitous security approach we have selected two projects that 
should provide some value for most organisations: Ubiquitous Identity Management and Ubiquitous Wireless 
Security. Obviously, it is not the aim of this paper to completely describe ubiquitous security in these areas: 
There is only room for a brief discussion and we will not be able to discuss potential responses to a detected 
security breach. 
As most organisations still rely on simple password based authentication, they obviously are unaware of the 
increased risk of masquerading attacks. Passwords are easily compromised through the use of cameras in phones 
and other devices, while the potential reuse of company passwords on the Internet may increase this risk even 
further.  
One approach to Ubiquitous Identity Management starts with a simple notification application that sends an 
SMS to the user’s phone when that user logs in. Notice that the user does not need have the phone when logging 
in, something that has prevented banks from introducing SMS for the communication of one time passwords. 
Still, sending an SMS for every login may not be the optimal solution. Our suggestion is to only send an SMS 
for an internal login when the physical access control system indicates that the user is not in the building. While 
this may prevent detection of internal masquerading attacks, it will be considered adequate security in many 
organisations and is better than using passwords alone. Further more, sending an SMS “You logged in at your 
desk but have not swiped your access card” will certainly increase security awareness. 
If this initial implementation is not secure enough, the organisation might consider a second authentication using 
the user's USB stick. While there are commercial USB based authentication systems available, a cheap software 
only solution should be fine for now, and can be kept separate from the original authentication system. As this is 
a second authentication system, there is no need to implement the ultimate perfect authentication mechanism. 
However, a one time password based system is preferable. After the normal login the user will be requested to 
insert the USB stick and if the second authentication is successful no SMS message will be send. The same 
system could also be used on the user's home computer by installing the necessary software there. Notice that 
when users forget their USB stick they can still login. 
If even more security is required, the organisation might now consider adding an SMS based authentication 
system as well. This is more intrusive but, when users forget their phone, access is still possible using the USB 
based authentication and an automatic SMS alert. If the user can not authenticate using a USB stick either,  login 
with a normal password may still be allowed, as long as a security administrator is alerted.  
While these are only the initial steps in the development of a full ubiquitous identity management system, it 
should be evident that such a system can be tailored for each organisation and that a software only solution will 
be a cheap alternative to current hardware based authentication systems.  
Our second example of an ubiquitous wireless security system is basically an agile but limited version of a new 
wireless intrusion detection system we have been developing. This system is based on the use of existing nodes 
in a WI-FI network, such as laptops and PDA's, as network sensors. When their wireless interface is not active, 
in particular when they are docked and connected to a fixed wire network, they can be used to collect network 
data. The original wireless intrusion detection system aims to provide an instantaneous response to 
masquerading attacks, in particular denial of service attacks, by detecting the difference in location between the 
original node and an attacker for particular frames using the difference in signal strength at each sensor.  
A similar approach to detect masquerading attacks can be used in an ubiquitous wireless security approach, by 
ensuring that access points and other vulnerable nodes listen for network frames with their own MAC address 
that they obviously did not send themselves. While this currently would need a change in the network cards 
firmware to really work well for most mobile devices, other devices such as access points sometimes already 
have a built in sensor. Furthermore, most current denial of service attacks are not very intelligent and can be 
detected even when the network node only listens occasionally. 
To further improve this system, we suggest the configuration of a DIY sensor network by adding several cheap 
network cards to existing PC's and by creating an application for laptops so they can detect whether they are 
docked and should register for this sensor network. The more sensors the better the location detection will be. 
To limit the amount of data that needs to be collected, the system only needs to collect the signal strength for a 
few types of control frames that are commonly used in attacks. A centralised intrusion detection system can 
collect this data and use the different signal strengths of a frame to compute the approximate location of origin 
for that frame. While our experiments have shown it will be difficult to separate an attacker that is in close 
proximity of the attacked system, attackers that are further away will be easy to detect.  
If the sensor network also collects signal strengths of frames during the initial authentication of a node with its 
access point, other security policies can be implemented to prevent wireless access from outside the building or 
to discourage wireless access if the node is close to its docking station. More importantly, however, this location 
information can now be used in the ubiquitous identity management system to decide if an SMS alert should be 
generated. 
CONCLUSION: 
In this paper we introduced several new concepts in the area of organisational security requirements 
engineering. The emphasis of this paper has been to describe some of the challenges that the use of security 
requirement engineering will face and to demonstrate the value of using this approach in stimulating innovation 
in organisational security. 
Our approach to organisational security requirement engineering is based on the assumption that the use of a 
heavyweight security requirements process in organisational security will eventually fail because most 
organisations are likely to take whatever shortcuts they can think of the reduce the cost of the requirements 
process. 
To support and encourage innovation in information security while using a lightweight security requirements 
process, we developed a requirement engineering approach with two additional dimensions. Adding a dimension 
based on agile security simply enables innovation. Another dimension, Ubiquitous Information Security, finally 
aims to stimulate and give direction to the creativity made possible by the agile security approach. Ubiquitous 
Information Security supports this agile approach by encouraging the use of simple and overlapping controls 
that can be tailored to an organisation's security needs. As each set of controls also includes at least one control 
aimed at detection of potential security failures, this approach will give the organisation better insight in its 
internal security to assist it in prioritising further agile security projects. 
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